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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

No one disputes that Respondent State of Idaho (the "State" or "Idaho") has the authority
to regulate the distribution, sale and possession of cigarettes so long as it exercises that authority
consistent with constitutional and statutory limitations. In this case, however, the State urges this
Court to disregard these statutory and constitutional limitations by ruling that two Idaho statutes
may regulate conduct that takes place on an out-of-state Indian reservation. Astonishingly, the
State beseeches the Court not to examine all of the constitutional issues raised by Appellant Scott
B. Maybee ("Maybee") in Appellant's Brief, claiming that Maybee failed to raise some issues

before the district court. Ironically, the Court is asked to ignore constitutional issues that were
raised in the district court by the State. The State cannot, as a matter of Jaw, claim that it is
entitled to summary judgment, and then claim that the Court cannot examine whether the State
has the constitutional authority to enforce the challenged statutes upon which it based its motion.
Once this Court has examined the statutory and constitutional issues presented in this appeal, it
will .conclude that the State lacks the authority to enforce these challenged statutes against
Maybee.
ARGUMENT
REBUTTAL POINT I
THE STATE LACKS THE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE COMPLEMENTARY ACT AGAINST MAYBEE

In 2003, the Legislature enacted the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement
Complementary Act ("Complementary Act"), codified at Title 39, Chapter 84 of the Idaho Code,

Boise-217439.! 0036346-00002
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as a procedural enhancement to the enforcement of the 1999 Tobacco Master Settlement Act (the
"MSA Act"), codified at Title 39, Chapter 78 of the Idaho Code. LC. § 39-8401. Both statutes
impose legal obligations on tobacco manufacturers whose cigarettes are stamped and sold in the
State. LC. § 39-7803; LC. § 39-8403.

Construed as a whole, these statutes create a

comprehensive and cohesive scheme regulating the sale of stamped cigarettes in intrastate
commerce.
There are two reasons why the State lacks the statutory and constitutional authority to
enforce the Complementary Act against Maybee. First, the Legislature clearly intended the
Complementary Act to only be applicable to cigarettes that are required to be stamped, and then
sold at retail in the State. 1 Because Maybee lawfully sells at retail unstamped cigarettes outside
of Idaho, his sales are not restricted by the provisions of the Complementary Act.
Second, the Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution preempts the
State from regulating on-reservation tobacco sales unless the State can point to an off-reservation
effect that impairs a significant state interest sought to be protected by the challenged statute.
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214-15 (1987); New Mexico v.
MescaJero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983). It is undisputed that Maybee accepts and
fills customer orders without leaving his place of business on the Seneca Nation Indian Territory
located within the New York State.
In its appellate brief, the State asserts that Maybee's "off-reservation activity" of
introducing tobacco into Idaho allows it to regulate Maybee's conduct. (State's Brief at 36).
1

A detailed analysis of the Complementary Act is set forth on pages 22 though 48 of the Appellant's Brief.
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Maybee does not dispute that his on-reservation sales to Idaho consumers has the off-reservation
effect of introducing cigarettes not listed on the Directory into Idaho. Yet, Maybee argues,
without contradiction from the State, that his sales of unstamped cigarettes do not impair any
legitimate state interest sought to be protected by the Complementary Act. Consequently, the
State is preempted from enforcing the Complementary Act against Maybee.

A.

The MSA Act and the Complementary Act Create a Complementary and
Cohesive Scheme to Regulate Stamped Cigarettes Sold at Retail in Intrastate
Commerce.

In its brief, the State rejects Maybee's assertion that the MSA Act and the
Complementary Act, being in pari materia, must be construed together to effect their
legislature's intent. (State's Brief at 21-27). The State mocks Maybee for being "nonsensical"
and "[o]ff-base" in claiming, "without citation," that these two Acts create a complementary and
cohesive scheme regulating the sale of stamped cigarettes in intrastate commerce. (Id. at 21, 25).
No Jess incorrectly, Maybee argues that because the Idaho MSA Act's escrow
requirement only applies to cigarettes stamped with an Idaho cigarette tax stamp,
this means the Complementary Act is also limited to such cigarettes. Appellant's
Brief, pp. 25-26. It is true that under the Idaho MSA Act nonparticipating
manufacturers only have to deposit escrow for those cigarettes for which an
Idaho cigarette tax stamp has been affixed. But it does not follow that this
means the Complementary Act only addresses such cigarettes.
(Id. at 26 [emphasis added]). The State continues to cling to its original argument that:
[t]he Complementary Act ... is much broader in scope because it prohibits the
sale of non-compliant cigarettes, a term that incorporates both stamped cigarettes
(units sold) and unstamped cigarettes.

Boise-217439.1 0036346-00002
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(COE #8 at 23 [emphasis in the original]). It also rejects Maybee's argument that the word
"cigarettes" cannot be read in isolation or in contravention of the "complementary and cohesive"
scheme envisioned by the Legislature. (State's Brief at 26).

1.

The Legislative History Shows that the MSA Act and the
Complementary Act Must Be Construed Together

When the Complementary Act was introduced to the Legislature as a bill ("H.B. 111 "), it
was described as:
AN ACT RELATING TO THE IDAHO TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT ACT; REPEALING SECTIONS 79-7804 AND 79-7805;
AMENDING TITLE 39, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW
CHAPTER 84, TITLE 39, IDAHO CODE, PROVIDING A STATEMENT OF
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE . . . ESTABLISHING A DUTY UPON
NONPARTICIPATING TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS TO CERTIFY
THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH IDAHO'S MASTER SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT ACT, ESTABLISHING A DIRECTORY OF COMPLIANT
TOBACCO PRODUCT MANUFACTURERS AND PROHIBITING THE
STAMPING OR SALE OF CIGARETTES NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
IDAHO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ACT ....
2003 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 33, p. 145. This description of the Complementary Act is consistent
with its findings and purposes set forth in LC. § 39-8401.

The Legislature intended the·

Complementary Act to be the procedural mechanism employed by the State to diligently enforce
the MSA Act.

Note that the bill's description does not speak of a directory consisting of

compliant cigarettes, but of compliant tobacco manufacturers.

It also describes the bill as

prohibiting the stamping or sale of cigarettes not in compliance with the MSA Act.

This

supports Maybee's contention that the Complementary Act, like the MSA Act, is applicable only
to cigarettes that are required to be stamped and then sold at retail in Idaho (i.e., units sold).

Boise-2 I 7439 .1 0036346-00002
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Prior to enacting the Complementary Act, non-participating tobacco manufacturers could
avoid their escrow obligations by distributing cigarettes not listed on the Directory to Idaho
wholesalers. Wholesalers would then affix Idaho tax stamps on these noncompliant cigarettes
and distribute them to Idaho retailers. Although Idaho taxes were being collected on these
noncompliant cigarettes, the State had no mechanism to calculate escrow payments for
manufacturers that were not reporting or under-reporting these sales.

By enacting the

Complementary Act, the Legislature intended to create a complementary and cohesive scheme to
ensure that non-participating manufacturers could not avoid their escrow obligations under the
MSA Act. See l.C. § 39-8401.
The Statement of Purpose, accompanying H.B. 111, also supports Maybee's argument as
to the legislative purpose behind the enactment of the Complementary Act. 2
This proposed legislation is designed to be complementary legislation to Idaho's
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act ("the [MSAJ Act"). Under Idaho's
Master Settle[ment] Agreement with the tobacco industry, Idaho must diligently
enforce the [MSA] Act. A number of tobacco product manufacturers are not
complying with the provisions of the [MSA] Act. Many of the non-compliant
manufacturers are located in foreign countries. Effecting compliance is in some
cases quite difficult because of their location. Requiring cigarette distributors to
only stamp and distribute cigarettes of tobacco product manufacturers that are
in compliance with the [MSAJ Act, and establishing procedures and remedies to
ensure that the [MSAJ Act's provisions will be followed will significantly
improve compliance under, and assist Idaho with its duty of enforcing, the
[MSA]Act.
http://www3.state.id.us/oasis/2003/H0l I I.html (emphasis added).

The statement directly

supports Maybee's argument that the Legislature envisioned the MSA Act and the
Deputy Attorney General Brett DeLange, the author of the State's Brief, is identified as the "contact" for
the legislation. See http://www3.state.id.us/oasis/2003/H0111.html.

2
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Complementary Act as a comprehensive and cohesive scheme to regulate cigarettes that are
required to be stamped and then sold at retail in intrastate commerce (i.e., units sold). The State
has already conceded that the MSA Act requires nonparticipating manufacturers "only ... to
deposit escrow for those cigarettes for which an Idaho cigarette tax stamp has been affixed."
(State's Brief at 26); accord I.C. § 39-7803. The Statement of Purpose directly contradicts the
State's other assertion that the Complementary Act was intended to be much broader in scope
than the MSA Act because "it prohibits the sale of non-compliant cigarettes, a term that
incorporates both stamped cigarettes (units sold) and unstamped cigarettes." (COE #8 at 23
[emphasis in original]; State's Brief at 26 [emphasis in original]). As its legislative history
shows, the Complementary Act was intended to establish "procedures and remedies to ensure
that the [MSA] Act's provisions will be followed," and to assist "Idaho with its duty of
enforcing" the MSA Act by "requiring cigarette distributors to only stamp and distribute
cigarettes . . . that are in compliance with the [MSA] Act." Maybee's interstate sales do not
trigger the escrow requirements of the MSA Act for tobacco manufacturers whose unstamped
cigarettes are sold at retail by Maybee to Idaho consumers. Consequently, Maybee is not subject
to the restrictions imposed by the Complementary Act on cigarettes sold at retail in the state.
2.

The MSA Act and the Complementary Act Regulate Out-of-State
Tobacco Manufacturers Whose Cigarettes Are Sold at Retail in
Intrastate Commerce.

The MSA Act requires all nonparticipating tobacco manufacturers, regardless of where
they are located, to make escrow payments based only on the number of "units sold" in the State.
LC.§ 39-7803(b)-(l). Units sold means:

Boise-217439 .1 0036346-(JOOOZ
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the number of individual cigarettes sold in the state by the applicable tobacco
manufacturer (whether directly or through a distributor, retailer or similar
intermediary or intermediaries) during the year in question, as measured by excise
taxes collected by the state on packs (or "roll-your-own" tobacco containers)
bearing the excise tax stamp of the state or on the "roll-your-own" tobacco
containers ....
LC. § 39-7802(j). Nonparticipating manufacturers, therefore, are required by the MSA Act to
make escrow payments only on "cigarettes sold in the state" that bear an Idaho tax-stamp.
Unstamped cigarettes lawfully sold in interstate commerce, on the other hand, should not be
considered "cigarettes sold in the state" under either the MSA Act or the Complementary Act
whose only purpose is to enforce the provisions of the MSA Act.
The State tries to undercut Maybee's argument that the MSA Act and the Complementary
Act create a complementary and cohesive scheme that regulate only stamped cigarettes sold at
retail in Idaho.

Through repeated mischaracterizations of Maybee's argument, the State

endeavors to complicate and confuse the issues presented in this appeal.
For example, on page 22 of its brief, the State argues that:
contrary to Maybee's statement, the Idaho MSA Act does not limit its escrow
obligation only to cigarettes stamped and sold in intrastate commerce.
(Emphasis in original). Later, the State contradicts its own statement and asserts that:
the [MSA] Act ... requires tobacco companies that have not joined the MSA,
wherever located, to pay escrow on cigarettes that ultimately are stamped for sale
in Idaho ....

Boise-217439.l 0036346-00002
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(State's Brief at 22). Contrary to the State's assertion, Maybee has never claimed that "cigarettes
sold [at wholesale] 3 in interstate commerce are not required to have Idaho cigarette tax stamps
affixed" if such cigarettes are to be re-sold in Idaho. (See id. at 23).
The State proffers another mischaracterization of "Maybee's view of the Idaho MSA
Act" by asserting:
The Idaho's MSA Act defines, in part, a tobacco product manufacturer as an
entity that manufactures cigarettes "anywhere such manufacturer intends to be
sold in the United States, including cigarettes intended to be sold in the United
States through an importer." The definition does not limit tobacco manufacturers
to those companies located within Idaho (of which there is one small "roll-yourown tobacco" company in Lewiston, Idaho) or only to the extent that they are
involved in intrastate commerce. Yet, under Maybee's view of the Idaho MSA
Act, the only entities needing to pay escrow would be Idaho-based tobacco
companies selling in intrastate commerce.
(Id. at 22 [emphasis added]).

Maybe has never contended that only "Idaho-based tobacco

companies selling in intrastate commerce" are subject to the escrow requirements of the MSA
Act. Maybee has acknowledged that both the MSA Act and the Complementary Act regulate
"[e]very tobacco manufacturer whose cigarettes are sold in this state." (See Appellant's Brief at
18). Nonparticipating manufacturers that sell unstamped cigarettes in interstate commerce to
Idaho wholesalers are required to make escrow payments if those cigarettes are stamped and then
sold in the State. See LC.§ 39-7803(b)(l).
The State further misleads this Court by claiming that LC. § 63-2505(2) and IDAP A
35.01.10.013 ("Rule 13") "does not exempt cigarette sales in interstate commerce from

Maybee has inserted the phrase "at wholesale" to clarify and distinguish cigarettes "sold at wholesale"
in interstate commerce from those "sold at retail" in interstate commerce.
3
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taxation." (State's Brief at 24). Section 63-2505(2) of the Idaho Code provides that "[a]ny
wholesaler engaged in interstate business ... shall be permitted to set aside such part of his
stock as may be necessary for the conduct of such interstate business without aff,xing the
stamps required by this chapter." (Emphasis added). Rule 13 further explains that "[ s]ales of

cigarettes in the course of interstate commerce for purposes of Section 63-2505, Idaho Code,
include only those sales where title is transferred outside the state of Idaho, or on U.S. military
reservations, or on Indian reservations." Pursuant to Rule 13, a wholesaler must also maintain
records of "all deliveries of [unstamped cigarettes] made outside the state of Idaho and all
deliveries [of unstamped cigarettes] made to U.S. military reservation or Indian reservation.... "
ID APA 35.01 .I 0.013.02. The State incorrectly limits the application of Rule 13 to shipments of
unstamped cigarettes made by out-of-state tobacco manufacturers to an Idaho licensed
wholesalers. (See State's Brief at 25). The plain language of Rule 13, however, speaks of
deliveries made outside of Idaho. In other words, out-of-state deliveries made by an Idaho
licensed wholesaler. Section 63-2505(2) and Rule 13 read together makes it perfectly clear that a
wholesaler may receive and sell unstamped cigarettes if such cigarettes are sold "in course of
interstate commerce" when title passes outside of the State. This interpretation is also consistent
with Commerce Clause principles that limit the State's ability to levy a tax on a "local" activity
preceding entry of the goods into interstate commerce.

See Commonwealth Edison Co. v.

Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981 ).
As the United States Supreme Court has found, a state tax is not immunized from
Commerce Clause scrutiny by simply claiming that the tax is imposed on goods prior to their
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entry into the stream of interstate commerce. Id. at 617. Under the four-part test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 430 U.S. 274,279 (1977), a "local" tax
will not offend the Interstate Commerce Clause if it is (I) applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing state, (2) fairly apportioned, (3) nondiscriminatory, and (4) fairly related to
services provided by the State. Section 63-2505(2) and Rule 13 avoid any constitutional conflict
by allowing an Idaho wholesaler to receive and sell unstamped cigarettes so long as the sales
take place outside of the State. Unstamped cigarettes lawfully sold in interstate commerce by
Idaho wholesalers are not within the definition of "units sold" and therefore do not trigger the
application of either the MSA Act or the Complementary Act since such cigarettes are not
stamped or sold in this State.
Maybee does not claim that either I.C. § 63-2505(2) or Rule 13 are applicable to his sales
of unstamped cigarettes to Idaho consumers. Instead, Maybee argues that the Commerce Clause
principles that underline the purpose behind I.C. § 63-2505(2) and Rule 13 also support
Maybee's claim that Idaho lacks the authority to require him to collect Idaho taxes or to affix an
Idaho tax-stamp on cigarettes sold in interstate commerce to Idaho consumers.
3.

Maybee Lawfully Sells Unstamped Cigarettes in Interstate Commerce
to Idaho Consumers for Their Personal Use and Consumption.

For the reasons previously stated in this Reply Brief, unstamped cigarettes that are
lawfully sold to Idaho consumers for their personal use and consumption do not trigger the
application of either the MSA Act or the Complementary Act. The State, however, dodges the
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issue of whether Maybee has lawfully sold unstamped cigarettes to Idaho consumers for their
personal use and consumption.
Before the district court, the State ridiculed Maybee for discussing the issue of tax
collection:
Defendant spends four pages arguing that the State cannot require Defendant to
collect and remit Idaho cigarette taxes. Defs Mem., pp 31-34. This is distracting
and a waste of time at best, because (1) the State has not sued Defendant for
failure to pay or collect Idaho cigarette taxes; (2) as early as last February 2007,
State's counsel told Defendant's counsel that the State was not suing Defendant
for failure to pay or collect Idaho cigarette taxes and that in Idaho only cigarette
wholesalers - not retailers like Defendant - have a duty to pay Idaho cigarette
taxes. (Cite omitted). Defendant even recognizes this in his memorandum. See
Defs Mem., p. 7. Why Defendant then wants to brief the issue is unclear.
Defendant ought not to burden the Court with arguments on an issue not before
the Court.
(COE #8 at 24-25). During oral argument, Deputy Attorney General Brett DeLange further
averted the issue by stating to the district court that:
Now, defendant spends a lot of time arguing that he can sell unstamped cigarettes.
And that just misses the point of this case.
(Tr. at 8). It is not Maybee, but the State that has missed the point.
Now, for the first time, the State asserts that:
Maybee's assertion that cigarettes sold in interstate commerce are not required to
have Idaho cigarettes tax stamps affixed is wrong. Idaho law clearly requires that
cigarettes, whether or not they have come to Idaho through interstate commerce,
are taxable and must have a tax stamped affixed. The requirement to affix stamps
is found in Idaho Code Section 63-2508, which . . . clearly requires that stamps
be affixed and tax paid on cigarettes that are imported into Idaho. It should go
without saying that cigarettes imported into Idaho are cigarettes in interstate
commerce.
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(State's Brief at 23-24). In its brief, the State fails to cite to LC. § 63-2513 and LC. § 6325 I 2(b), which authorize a person to possess, purchase and consume a carton or less of
unstamped cigarettes.
The State has no constitutional authority to require Maybee to affix tax stamps on
cigarettes sold to Idaho consumers who import such cigarettes for their personal use and
consumption. 4 The United States Supreme Court has protected interstate delivery sellers from
state intrusions that unduly burden interstate commerce. See, M-, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Dept. of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992);
Commonwealth, 453 U.S. at 629 ("when the measure of a tax bears no relationship to the
taxpayers' presence or activities in a State, a court may properly conclude under the fourth prong
of the Complete Auto Transit test that the State is imposing an undue burden on interstate
commerce").
In Bellas Hess, the United States Supreme Court noted that:
it is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more
exclusively interstate in character than the mail order transaction
here involved.
386 U.S. at 759. In Bellas Hess, the State of Illinois attempted to collect use taxes on delivery
sales of goods shipped into Illinois from an out-of-state retailer. Id. at 754. The Court found that
the out-of-state mail-order firm had no office, no sales agents or solicitors, no property or no

Because the State restricts the number of cigarettes that may be purchased in interstate commerce
without restricting the number of cigarettes that may be purchased in intrastate commerce, it
discriminates against and unduly burdens interstate commerce. Quill, 504 U.S. 298; Granholm v. Heald, 544
U.S. 460 (2005).
4
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telephone listing in the State of Illinois. The mail-order firm's only contact with Illinois was
through the United States Postal Service or a common carrier. Id. The Court opined that:
if the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon National [Bellas Hess]
were upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free conduct of its interstate
business would be neither imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such
burdens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every
school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with
power to impose sales and use taxes. The many variations in rates of tax, in
allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping requirements
could entangle National's interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated
obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose a fair share of
the cost of the local government.
The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy free
from such unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution, this is a
domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and control.
Id. at 759. The Court held that the dormant aspect of the Interstate Commerce Clause abrogates
any powers in the State to regulate or unduly burden interstate commerce. Id. Consequently, the
Illinois statute was declared unconstitutional. Id.
In Quill, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Bellas Hess bright-line rule. The Court again
held that an out-of-state seller whose only contact with the taxing state is by mail or common
carrier lacks the substantial connection required by the Commerce Clause for the state to impose
sales and use taxes. Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18. This "bright line" demarcation of authority was
and is necessary to avoid the imposition of a multiplicity of onerous obligations, not only by the
states but "by the nation's 6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions." Id. at 313. The Court also noted that
this bright-line rule "in the area of sales and use taxes also encourages settled expectation and, in
doing so, fosters investment by businesses and individuals." Id. at 316.
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In both Bellas Hess and Quill, the state tax regulations in question were even-handedly
applied to both in-state and out-of-state retailers. The regulations required all retailers to collect
and remit sales or use taxes on goods sold to state residents. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
held that these nondiscriminatory tax regulations placed an undue burden on interstate
commerce, and the tax regulations in both cases were declared unconstitutional.
Unlike other goods sold in interstate commerce, federal law requires cigarettes shipped
and sold to out-of-state consumers be reported to the taxing authority within the consumer's
home state. Jenkins Act, 15 U.S.C. § 375 et seq. The purpose of the Jenkins Act is to assist
states in the collection of tobacco taxes. Idaho, therefore, has the ability, based on the Jenkins
Reports filed by Maybee, to collect its state taxes from its residents upon whom the tax
obligation ultimately falls. As a delivery seller who has no physical nexus in this state, Maybee
cannot constitutionally be required to collect and remit Idaho taxes.
While dodging the question of whether Maybee may lawfully sell unstamped cigarettes to
Idaho consumers, the State also fails to inform the Court that Idaho's tax law does not prohibit an
Idaho consumer from purchasing one carton (IO packs or less) of unstamped cigarettes from an
out-of-state delivery seller. Accord J.C. § 63-25 lZ(b ). 5 Consequently, Maybee may lawfully sell
and Idaho consumers may lawfully receive for their personal use and consumption, unstamped
cigarettes in interstate commerce.

'Because Congress has enacted the Jenkins Act to assist states in the collection of state cigarette taxes, a state cannot
limit the number of cigarettes that a resident imports for their own personal use and consumption if the state does
not restrict the number of cigarettes that can be purchased within the state. Section 63-251 Z(b) would fail the thirdprong of the Complete Auto test because it discriminates against and unduly burdens interstate commerce by
restricting the number of cigarettes that a consumer may purchase in interstate commerce,
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Finally, it is undisputed that Maybee sells only to adult consumers, over the age of 21,
who import cigarettes for their personal use and consumption. (COE #6 ,i 17). Idaho consumers
who possess unstamped cigarettes for their own personal use and consumption are not subject to
the restriction imposed by the Complementary Act. See I.C. § 39-8403. If the Legislature
intended to restrict Idaho consumers from purchasing unstamped cigarettes not listed on the
Directory in interstate commerce, it could have easily accomplished this objective. By removing
the phrase "for sale,"§ 39-8403(3)(b) of the Complementary Act would have simply stated that a
person may not "sell, offer, or possess in this state, cigarettes" not listed on the Directory.
Instead, the Complementary Act only makes it unlawful for a person to "possess for sale in this
state" cigarettes not listed on the Directory. LC. 39-8403(3)(b).
The Complementary Act only prohibits Maybee from "introduc[ing] non-compliant
tobacco into the State" when he "knows or should know" these cigarettes are intended for
distribution or sale in the State. I.C. § 39-8403(3)(c). In other words, an out-of-state delivery
seller may be held liable under the Complementary Act if the seller knows or should know that
the consumer will re-distribute or re-sell the non-compliant cigarettes in the state (i.e., intrastate).
The undisputed facts in this case show that Maybee only sells cigarettes to consumers for their
personal use and.consumption. (COE #6 ,ii 7; COE #9, Ex. J at !DAG 142978). Since Maybee
does not sell cigarettes that are intended for distribution or sale in the State, he cannot be found
in violation of the Complementary Act.
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4.

Maybee Does Not Sell in Idaho Noncompliant Cigarettes.

The Complementary Act seeks to enforce the obligation of "[ e]very tobacco product
manufacturer whose cigarettes are sold in this state whether directly or through a wholesale,
distributor, retailer or similar intermediary or intermediaries." LC. § 39-8403(1). Section 398403 alone has 17 direct or indirect references to the phrase "cigarettes sold in the state." As a
retailer of tobacco products, Maybee is only subject to the Complementary Act if his "cigarettes
are sold in this state."
Throughout its brief, the State avows that the Complementary Act "prohibits, in part,
'any person' from selling in Idaho" noncompliant cigarettes.

(State's Brief at 28). 6 After

acknowledging that the Complementary Act prohibits noncompliant cigarettes from being sold in
Idaho, the State then asserts that "where and when title transfer with respect to the sale of
Maybee's cigarettes is irrelevant to determining whether Maybee has violated the
Complementary Act." (State's Brief at 28 [emphasis in original]). Unless the State concedes
that Maybee's sales take place outside of Idaho, "where and when title transfers" is relevant to
the issue of whether Maybee has sold or offered to sell cigarettes "in this state."
The State disputes, as it must to avoid a reversal of its judgment, that the Complementary
Act excludes Maybee's out-of-state delivery sales. Without citation to any legal authority, the
State offers the Court the following summary conclusion:

6

On page 8 of its Brief, the State declares that "only cigarettes that are listed on the Idaho Directory may be sold in
Idaho." On page 16, the State averts that Maybee has sold millions of"cigarette brands that have been and are still
today illegal to be sold in Idaho pursuant to the Complementary Act .... " On page 29, the State alleges that
"Maybee sold cigarettes in Idaho for purposes of applying the Complementary Act."
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The undisputed facts are that Idaho consumers, in Idaho, ordered the cigarettes at
issue from Maybee, Idaho consumers, in Idaho, paid for these cigarettes. And
Idaho consumers signed for and received these cigarettes in Idaho. This is
enough to establish that Maybee sold cigarettes in Idaho for purposes of
applying the Complementary Act.
(State's Brief at 29 [emphasis added]). But the fact an Idaho customer orders, pays for, signs for
and receives cigarettes in Idaho is insufficient to establish a sale in the state. The State's
conclusion that Maybee's sales takes place in the state ignores well-settled common law and
statutory law involving the sales of goods.
a.

Maybee's position is supported by common law.

At common law, a sale is an agreement between a seller and a buyer to transfer
ownership of an item from the seller to the buyer for consideration. In a commercial setting, the
buyer makes an offer to purchase identifiable goods for a specific price from a specific seller.
The seller accepts the offer by relinquishing the goods to the buyer, thus completing the sale. A
sale, of course, can later be rescinded if the buyer returns and seeks a refund for the goods; but it
does not alter the fact that a prior sale had been made or completed.
In a non-face-to-face sale (i.e., a delivery sale), the buyer makes an "offer" by sending an
order identifying the goods to be purchased. The offer is not valid until it is received by the
seller. I Williston on Contracts§§ 4:16, 4:18 (4 th ed.). The buyer also must send with the order
either payment or a promise to pay so that the seller's acceptance, based on consideration, forms
a valid contract for sale. 2 Williston on Contracts§ 6:62 (4 th ed.); 17 C.J.S. Contracts§ 84. A
delivery seller may accept the offer by mailing the goods to the buyer. The contract for sale, in
this situation, is completed at the point of mailing. 2 Williston on Contracts § 6:62 (4 th ed.).
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Applying these common law principles, Maybee's delivery sales are complete when Maybee
receives the order and payment from the consumer, then sends the goods to the consumer.

Consequently, under well-established common law, Maybee's sales are completed outside of
Idaho.
Under the Complementary Act, "cigarettes sold in the state" are "measured by excise
taxes collected by the state on packs ... bearing the excise tax stamps of the state." Idaho Code
§ 39-8402(10) (citing the definition of"units sold" in Idaho Code§ 39-78020)). As the State has

already conceded, only stamped cigarettes fall within this category. (State's Brief at 26).
Therefore, unstamped cigarettes sold by Maybee do not fall within the category of "cigarettes
sold in the state" and do not trigger the application of the Complementary Act.
b.

The Court may be guided by the Uniform Commercial Code.

Based on the plain language of the statute, as well as Idaho common law, Maybee has
shown that his delivery sales do not take place in Idaho for purposes of the Complementary Act.
On pages 30 through 35 of the Appellant's Brief, Maybee also argues that his sales take place
outside of Idaho in accordance with Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),
codified as Title 28, Chapter 2 of the Idaho Code.
In reply to Maybee's U.C.C. argument, the State retorts that Maybee "lacks any legal
basis for applying the UCC to the Complementary Act." (State's Brief at 28).
There is no support for the proposition that the determination of when and where
title passes dictates whether a separate, substantive, regulatory statute has been
violated. Indeed, the comments to the UCC expressly state that when or where
title to a product transfers does not answer or address application of a public
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regulation such as the Complementary Act. Idaho Code Section 28-2-401 is
clear: it only applies when "matters concerning title become material. "
(Id. at 29). The State also asserts that LC. § 28-2-401 only "deals with passage of title for
purposes of determining the rights of the seller's creditors and a good faith purchaser's rights to
goods." (Id.).
First, the State incorrectly limits the application of J.C. § 28-2-401, codified within Part
4, Chapter 2, Title 28 of the Idaho Code. Part 4 deals with three separate issues: passing of title
(I.C. § 28-2-401); rights of creditors (J.C. § 28-2-402); and rights of good faith purchasers (J.C.§
28-2-403). However, courts have been guided by U.C.C. § 2-401 to resolve issues of when,
where and if a sale has occurred for purposes of determining the applicability of "a separate,
substantive, regulatory statute." These "public regulations" have included state tax laws and
regulations, consumer protection laws, and alcohol control laws.

See, ~, Franklin Fibre-

Lamitex Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 505 A.2d 1296, 1298 (Del. Sup. 1985; Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 439 Mass. 629, 635 (2003); In re Valley Media, Inc.,
226 Fed. Appx. 120, 122-123 (3d Cir. 2007); Carlson v. Monaco Coach Corp, 486 F. Supp.2d
1127, 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2007); California State Electronics Assn. v. Zeos Internat. Ltd., 41 Cal
App.4 th 1270, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 127 (1996); S.K.I. Beer Cmp. v. Barilka Brewers, 443 F. Supp.2d
313 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). In fact, this Court cited J.C.§ 28-2-401 as authority to determine whether
a "sale at retail" had occurred, requiring the collection of Idaho sales taxes. Old West Reality,
Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comrn'n, 110 Idaho 546, 548-49, 716 P.2d 1318, 1320-21 (1986). In the
cases cited above, no issue was presented to those courts involving the rights of creditors or the
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rights of good faith purchasers.

In each case, the court determined whether a particular

regulatory state statute was applicable based on whether a sale had taken place within that state.
Second, the State misinterprets the official comment to U.C.C. § 2-401. Prior to a state's
adoption of the U.C.C., state courts had decided cases where the applicability of "public"
regulation depended upon a "sale" or upon the location of "title."

The official comment was

added by the drafters to signify that U.C.C. § 2-401 did not intend for those prior cases to be
ignored for purposes of deciding when or where a "sale" takes place. The official comments
merely state that it is for a court to decide "which line of interpretation should be followed." As
the comment later reflects, the drafters also recognized that there are situations where courts are
called upon to decide "matters concerning title become material":
It is therefore necessary to state what a "sale" is and when title passes under this
Article in case the courts deems any public regulation to incorporate the defined
term of the "private" law.
LC. § 28-2-401 (Comment 1). The official comment, therefore, contemplates that courts may
look to the U.C.C. to guide them in deciding if, when, or where a sale has occurred to determine
the applicability of a public regulation.
Finally, the State fails to recognize that when and where a sale takes place is relevant to
this case. The Complementary Act makes it unlawful for a person to sell, offer or possess
noncompliant cigarettes "for sale in this state." LC. § 39-8403(3). If Maybee's sales do not take
place in this State, then the Court cannot find that he is in violation of the Complementary Act.
In Appellant's Brief, Maybee cited in support of his claim that his sales take place outside
of Idaho. California State Electronics Assn. v. Zeos Internat. Ltd., 41 Cal App.4th 1270, 49 Cal.
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Rptr.2d 127 (1996).

In its brief, the State attempts to distinguish the holding in Zeos by

asserting:
the California warranty law relied upon by the trade association in that case states
that California's UCC title transfer rules control how the warrant law is to be
applied.
(State's Brief at 30). This statement is misleading.
The California Warranty Act does not specifically reference the provision ofU.C.C. § 2401. The California court simply noted that:
The Consumer Warranty Act itself provides that its provisions shall preserve the
rights and obligations of buyers and sellers "determined by reference to the
Commercial Code," except in the event of a conflict between the provisions of the
latter and the rights guaranteed buyers by the former.
41 Cal App.4th at 1275, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d at 131. Because the Consumer Warranty Act was
limited to consumer goods "sold in this state" and defined "sale" to mean "the passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price," the California court held that applying the provisions of
U.C.C. § 2-401 to determine the point of sale created no facial conflict and would be consistent
with the legislative intent behind the Consumer Warranty Act. Id. at 1276, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d at
131.
Another case cited by Maybee in Appellant's Brief is S.K.L Beer Corp. v. Barilka
Brewers, 443 F. Supp.2d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).

In that case, a New York beer wholesaler

brought an action in federal court against a Russian brewery, claiming the cancellation of a
distribution agreement without notice violated the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, a
public regulation. The federal court ruled that the New York statute was applicable to breweries
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that "sell or offer to sell beer" in New York State. Relying upon U.C.C. § 2-401, the court ruled
that the New York wholesaler had no cause of action under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law
because all sales between the New York wholesaler and the Russian brewery took place at the
point of shipment in Russia.
By misreading the facts in Barilka, the State seeks to distinguish it from this case:
Unlike the defendant in [Barilka], Maybee does not require Idaho consumers to
come to New York to pick up their cigarette orders.
(State's Brief at 31). In Barilka, the distribution agreement provided that the goods were to be
delivered "FCA St. Petersburg." 443 F. Supp. 2d at 315. The phrase "FCA 7 St. Petersburg"
indicates an international shipping code that means the seller delivers the goods, cleared for
export, to the carrier designated by the buyer in St. Petersburg.

Id. fn. 4. The New York

wholesaler never "picked up" the goods at the Russian factory, as suggested by the State in its
brief. (State's Brief at 3 l). Under the terms of the distribution agreement, the Russian brewery
delivered the goods to the New York wholesaler when the goods were cleared for export and
"handed over" to the carrier designated by the New York wholesaler in St. Petersburg. 443 F.
Supp. 2d at 322. Consequently, the federal court ruled that the sale took place in Russia at the
point of shipment. The facts are indistinguishable from the facts in this case.
Here, the place of sale limits the application of the Complementary Act; this public law
only applies to sales transacted in Idaho. By its very language, the Complementary Act requires
the Court to look to the private law to determine when and where a sale of goods occurs between

7

http://www.iccwbo.org/incoterms/preambles/pdf/FCA.pdf gives complete definition for the abbreviation"FCA."
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a seller and a buyer. The Court should not ignore the provisions of Idaho Code § 28-2-401,
which was enacted by the Legislature to determine such issues and does not conflict with the
provisions of the Complementary Act, enacted after the adoption of the U.C.C.
c.

The State has abandoned its theory ofjudicial estoppels.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, the State argued to the district court that
Maybee should be judicially estopped from asserting that his sales take place outside of Idaho.
On appeal, the State appears to have abandoned this position by stating:
The State has not found a case in the context of judicial estoppels in which the
sworn statement at issue has subsequently been changed by the party who made
the statement in the first place. Whether Maybee should still be judicial estopped
in such circumstances is thus unclear, but it is of no moment and Maybee's
raising it here is a straw man.
(State's Brief at 33). Given how the State has repeatedly mischaracterized Maybee's arguments
in this case, it is ironic that the State now accuses Maybee of presenting a "straw man" argument
to the Court. In any case, the State appears to abandon the position it had originally taken before
the district court.
5.

Maybee Does Not Offer for Sale in Idaho Noncompliant Cigarettes.

In its brief, the State asserts that "[i]t defies credibility for Maybee to say that he did not
offer his cigarettes for sale to Idaho consumers in Idaho" when he mails fliers advertising
cigarettes not listed on the Directory to his Idaho consumers. (State's Brief at 27). Maybee does
not dispute that he advertises cigarettes for sale. 8 However, Maybee does dispute that he

8

In an exhibit submitted to the district court, the State introduced an advertisement (i.e., a flyer) sent by Maybee to
his consumers. (COE #3 115, Ex. D). However, the State never referenced the "advertisement" in its briefs or
during oral argument before the district court. For the first time, the State now refers to this flier as a "mail
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"offers" or "advertises" cigarettes for sale in Idaho. The question presented to this Court is
whether the Complementary Act restricts certain cigarette brands from being offered for sale in
Idaho or from being offered for sale to Idaho consumers. More importantly, the Court should

consider whether a flier mailed to consumers constitutes an "offer for sale" within the meaning
and context of the Complementary Act.
An advertisement sent to consumers is not an "offer" in the context of contract law. I
Williston on Contracts § 4:10 (4th ed.). As a general rule, "advertisements in the media (e.g.
internet, email, television, radio, newspapers, etc.) are not offers, but merely invitations to
bargain." 27 Williston on Contracts § 70: 120 (4 th ed.). Therefore, by advertising on the internet
or sending fliers through the mail, Maybee is not making an "offer" to enter into a contract for
sale.
Whether the Legislature intended to regulate cigarette advertising raises an issue of
federal preemption. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. ReiJly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).

Since the

Legislature is presumed to have acted within its constitutional authority, the Court should reject
any notion that merely advertising noncompliant cigarettes is enough to violate the provisions of
the Complementary Act. Accord McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 814,
135 P.3d 756, 760 (2006). The United States Supreme Court has held that the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution preempts any state law or regulation that restricts or prohibits
the advertising of any cigarettes, the package of which is labeled in conformity with the Federal

solicitation" to show that Maybee solicits and offers cigarettes for sale. The State, however, never alleged that
Maybee sent these fliers unsolicited to the general public. Maybee proffers that these fliers are only sent to his
previous consumers.
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Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("FCLAA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Lorillard, 533 U.S. at
550-51.
The Court should also be guided by the holding in Barilka, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 319-320.
In that case, the federal court was called upon to interpret the phrase "in this state" as used in the
New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. 443 F. Supp.2d at 318. Under the New York
statute, "brewers" are defined as "any person or entity engaged primarily in business as a brewer,
manufacturer of alcoholic beverages, importer, marketer, broker or agent of any of the foregoing
who sells or offers to sell beer to a beer wholesaler in this state or any successor to a brewer."
Id. at 318. The question presented to the court was whether the phrase "in this state" modified
"a beer wholesaler" or the phrase "sells or offers to sell beer." Relying upon the Commerce
Clause, the court rejected the interpretation that the New York statute was intended to apply to
"any transaction anywhere in the world with a licensed New York wholesaler." Id. at 319-20
(citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) and Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
642-43 (1982) ["The 'Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders whether or not the commerce
has effects within the State."']).

The court, therefore, concluded that the "only sensible

interpretation" of the New York statute is to limit its application to a brewery that "sells or offers
to sell beer ... in this state." Id. at 320.
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B.

The Legislature Did Not Intend the Minors' Access Act to Expand the Scope
of the Complementary Act.

Although the State claims that Maybee cannot lawfully sell or offer to sell unstamped
cigarettes not listed on the Idaho Directory to Idaho consumers, its argument is premised not on
the plain meaning of the Complementary Act, but on a distorted reading of the Prevention of
Minors' Access to Tobacco Act ("Minors' Access Act"), codified at Title 39, Chapter 57 of the
Idaho Code. (State's Brief at 16, 17-21, 32, 33). In the State's world, "the Legislature made it
crystal clear [by enacting the Minors' Access Act) that Internet cigarette sellers like Maybee
must comply with the Complementary Act." (State's Brief at 18 [emphasis added)). However,
the section of the Minors' Access Act, cited by the State, makes no direct reference to the
Complementary Act. (State's Brief at 18 citing LC.§ 39-5714(2)).
Section 39-5714(2) of the Minors' Access Act provides that a delivery sale must comply
with certain specific provisions within that act, as well as:
all other Jaws of the state of Idaho generally applicable to sales of tobacco
products that occur entirely within Idaho including, but not limited to, those
laws imposing excise taxes, sales and use taxes, licensing and tax stamping
requirements and escrow or other payment obligations.
(Emphasis added). The State conceded before the district court that Maybee is not required to
collect "excise taxes [or] sales and uses taxes" or required to affix tax-stamps on cigarettes sold
to Idaho consumers. (COE #8 at 24-25; Tr. at 8; COE #7, Ex.E). This concession was made to
avoid the constitutional issues that would otherwise be raised. 9 Since Maybee is not a tobacco

'For a discussion as to constitutional limitations on the State's authority to tax, see pages 18 through 23 of
this Reply Brief.
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manufacturer, he is also not subject to escrow payments under the MSA Act. LC. § 39-7803. In
fact, the State has not alleged that Maybee is subject to any "payment obligations" that are
"generally applicable to sales of tobacco products that occur entirely within Idaho."

It is

puzzling that, when the State concedes that Maybee is not subject to the State's tax and stamping
laws (laws specifically listed LC. § 39-5714(2)) and tobacco manufacturers who supply Maybee
with unstamped cigarettes are not subject to the escrow requirements of the MSA Act, how it can
claim that the Minors' Access Act makes "crystal clear" that Maybee is subject to the
Complementary Act (a law not specifically listed) regardless of where his sales take place.
(State's Brief at 32).
As noted earlier, LC. § 39-8403 of the Complementary Act alone has 17 direct or indirect
references to the phrase "cigarettes sold in the state." As its legislative history shows the
Complementary Act was enacted solely to enforce the escrow provisions of the MSA Act. More
importantly, both the MSA Act and the Complementary Act are primarily concerned with those
brands that may be sold, offered or possessed for sale in Idaho.
Remarkably, the State ignores the Complementary Act's plain language, its legislative
history and its repeated references to the MSA Act, and refers the Court to the Minors' Access
Act, a law whose primary purpose is to prevent sales of all cigarettes to minors. Again, the State
creates a "straw man" analysis of Maybee's argument. (State's Brief at 18-21). Maybee has
never asserted that the Legislature intended the provisions of the Minors' Access Act to apply
only to intrastate delivery sellers. On the contrary, the Legislature intended the Minors' Access
Act to generally apply to all delivery sellers, but recognized that certain state tobacco Jaws are
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only applicable "to sales of tobacco products that occur entirely within Idaho." Among those
tobacco laws that are "generally applicable to sales of tobacco products that occur entirely within
Idaho" are "laws imposing excise taxes, sales and use taxes, licensing 10 and tax stamping
requirements and escrow or other payment obligations."
As part of its straw man argument, the State asserts that the Minors' Access Act was
enacted to close a "hole in existing law ... in other tobacco sales laws like the Complementary
Act." (State's Brief at 20). The State, however, skirts the issue as to what "hole" existed in the
Complementary Act that the Legislature intended to fill by enacting the Minors' Access Act. It
is this straw man argument that exposes the weakness in the State's argument. The State must
admit that the plain language of the Complementary Act only applies to cigarettes sold in the
state, before it can assert that the Minors' Access Act intended to close a "hole in existing law."
In reviewing the legislative history, it would appear that the Legislature intended to close
a "hole" only in the Minors' Access Act. The Statement of Purpose filed with the Legislature
states:
Over the past several years, the State of Idaho has been a leader in preventing
youth access to tobacco products. With the rise of tobacco sales via the internet
and other direct sales means, a hole in existing Idaho law has surfaced. This
legislation would stop a delivery sale of tobacco products to any individual who is
under the legal minimum purchase age in Idaho.
This legislation would require delivery only to adults that are verified to be of
legal age.

The Legislature used the phrase "licensing and tax stamping requirement" to mean requirements
applicable to licensed wholesalers who affix tax-stamps on cigarettes sold in the state.

10
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The act further provides for enforcement against those who violate the provisions
of the act.
http://www3.state.id.us/oasis/2003/H03S7.html. Prior to 2003, the State had no provisions in the
Minors' Access Act to verify the age of consumer in a non-face-to-face transaction.

By

amending and adding provisions to the Minors' Access Act, the Legislature set forth
requirements for delivery sales, including provisions relating to age-verification, disclosure and
notice of pertinent legal information, shipping and reporting requirements for delivery sellers,
and enforcement. Nothing in the Minors' Access Act or its legal history supports the State's
argument that the Legislature intended the Minors' Access Act to expand the scope of the
Complementary Act to delivery sales conducted outside ofidaho.
REBUTTAL POINT II
THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE PREEMPTS THE ST ATE
FROM ENFORCING EITHER THE COMPLEMENTARY ACT
OR THE MINORS' ACCESS ACT AGAINST MAYBEE

The State argues that the "Indian Commerce Clause . . . possesses no dormant, or
independently preempting component." (State's Brief at 35). This statement is fundamentally
flawed. As the United States Supreme Court has found, "the central function of the Indian
Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian
affairs."

Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).

The word

"plenary" means "complete in every respect." 11 Since Congress is vested with plenary power,
state law historically has had "no role to play" within reservation boundaries. Wagnon v. Prairie

" Black's Law Dictionary defines "plenary" to mean "[f]ull, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified."
Black's Law Dictionary 1038 (5 th ed. 1979).
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Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 101 (2005); Mcclanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 168 (1973) ("[t]he policy of leaving Indian [reservations] free from state jurisdiction
and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history."). More importantly, federal pre-emption
under the Indian Commerce Clause is "not limited to cases in which Congress has expressly - as
compared to impliedly - pre-empted the state activity." McClanahan, 411 U.S at I 75 fn13;
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176-77.

Questions of pre-emption in the area of Indian

jurisprudence, therefore, are not resolved by reference to standards that have developed in other
areas of the law. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176.
Cases decided by the United States Supreme Court refute the State's view that the
"Indian Commerce Clause ... possesses no dormant, or independently preempting component."
In Indian tax immunity cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that states cannot tax the income or
property of reservation Indians despite the fact that Congress has never enacted a law addressing
state taxation of Indians residing on reservations.

See, M·, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S.

373 (1976) (state personal property tax); McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (state income tax); Moe v.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (state
cigarette taxes); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (state motor
fuel tax). Prior to Congress' enactment of the Indian Gaming Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.,
California was preempted by the United States Supreme Court from enforcing state and county
gambling laws against a tribal bingo establishment, even though these high stake games were
"played predominately by non-Indians coming onto the reservations." California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,205 (1987).
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In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983), the United States
Supreme Court held that New Mexico was preempted from enforcing state hunting and fishing
laws against non-tribal members on tribal land. The Court cautioned that it was "treacherous to
import ... notions of preemption that are properly applied to other contexts" to cases arising from
conduct that takes place on Indian reservations. Id. at 334.
By resting preemption analysis principally on a consideration of the nature of the
competing interests at stake, our cases have rejected a narrow focus on
congressional intent to preempt State law as the sole touchstone. They have also
rejected the proposition that preemption requires "an express congressional
statement to that effect." Bracker, supra, 448 U.S. at 144, 100 S.Ct. at 2584
(footnote omitted). State jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law
if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in
federal law, unless the State interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion
of State authority. Bracker, supra, 448 U.S. at 145, 100 S.Ct. at 2584.
Id.

Mescalero found that New Mexico was preempted from enforcing its hunting and fishing

laws despite the fact that Congress had not enacted any law regulating hunting or fishing on
Indian reservations.
Based on these cases, the Court must reject, as a matter of law, the State's assertion that
the "Indian Commerce Clause merely empowers Congress to act and has no independently
preemptive function." (State's Brief at 36). The Court must also reject the State's "revealing"
assertion that:
every decision that Maybee cites for "preemption" under the Indian Commerce

actually involves application of the Supremacy Clause through, as a general
matter, invocation of federal common law principles.
(State's Brief at 36). This statement is patently false.

In McClahahan, Moe, Bryan, Mescalero,

Cabazon, Cotton Petroleum and Chickasaw, the United States preempted the enforcement of
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state Jaws based solely on the Indian Commerce Clause, without any discussion relating to the
Supremacy Clause. Maybee acknowledges that, if a state statute cannot be enforced because of
the Indian Commerce Clause, it also cannot be enforced because of the Supremacy Clause. U.S.
Const. Art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."). However, he cannot be denied relief simply because he did
not assert an alternative defense based on the Supremacy Clause.

A.

The Court Must Apply the Bracker Interest-Balancing Test

The United States Supreme Court has set forth several basic principles with respect to a
state's civil regulatory authority to regulate the conduct of Indians and non-Indians. White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980). The preemption analysis begins
with two categories - off-reservation conduct and on-reservation conduct.
Undisputedly, the state has the authority to regulate the off-reservation conduct of nonIndians that takes place within its state. See,~, Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95 (Kansas may tax a nonIndian distributor's off-reservation receipt of fuel without being subject to the Bracker interestbalancing test). When tribal nations or their members leave the boundaries of the reservation,
they may be "subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the
State." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973) (state could impose
nondiscriminatory gross receipts tax on a ski resort operated by a tribe on off-reservation land).
"[U]nder certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activities of
nonmembers on a reservation, and ... in exceptional circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction
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over the on-reservation activities of tribal members." Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214-215. Whenever
a state asserts authority to regulate on-reservation conduct, the Court must apply the Bracker
interest-balancing test to the pre-emption analysis. The more difficult analysis arises where a
state asserts authority over on-reservation conduct of non-Indians. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144. In
these instances, a state must have a significant regulatory interest that outweighs federal and
tribal interests. Id. at 145. Finally, when on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at
issue, state laws are generally inapplicable. Id. at 144. Under these "exceptional" instances, the
state's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal
self-government is at its strongest. Id.
When a state's civil regulatory authority is being challenged, "who" is being impacted by
a state statute and "where" the conduct being regulated takes place are two questions that "have
significant consequences." Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 101. With regards to the "where," the Supreme
Court has stated that:
[T]here is a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty, a
component which remains highly relevant to the pre-emption inquiry; though the
reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh in
determining whether state authority has exceeded the permissible limits. " 'The
cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments
over their reservations.' "
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151, quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,223 (1959). The pre-emption
analysis, therefore, begins with a "fair interpretation" of the statue, "as written and applied."
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 103.
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B.

The State Seeks to Regulate and Enjoin Only On-Reservation Conduct

The State claims "Maybee is treated no differently than other remote vendors, 12 and the
fact that he is located on his reservation is thus irrelevant to this case." (State's Brief at 38). The
undisputed facts in this case do not support the State's contention that "Maybee is treated no
differently than other remote vendors . . . ." (See id.).

There are more than 1800 websites

offering to sell tobacco products to Idaho consumers. (COE #7, Ex.Fat !DAG 139650). Most
of these sites do not report their delivery sales or inform buyers of their responsibility to pay all
applicable taxes. (COE #7, Ex. F at IDAG 139651). Unlike most delivery sellers, Maybee
reports all shipments of unstamped cigarettes on a monthly basis to the State pursuant to the
Jenkins Act, 15 U.S.C. § 376. (COE #6, iJ29). Maybee, however, is the only delivery seller to
have ever been sued by the State. (COE #7, Exs. G • I).
As a matter of law, the fact that Maybee sells and ships cigarettes without leaving his
place of business on the Seneca Nation territory is relevant and material to the determination of
this case. The State, however, asserts that:
Maybee liability for violating the Complementary Act arises from selling and
shipping to Idaho consumers cigarettes that are not on the Idaho Directory, while
his violation of the Minors' Access Act stems from failure to obtain a tobacco
permit for those retail cigarettes sales. Neither of these violations depends upon
where he does business; i.e., the "trigger[ing]" event for statutory coverage is the
fact that he causes cigarettes to be introduced into this State.
(State's Brief at 38). The State mistakenly relies on two decisions rendered by the United States
Supreme Court to support its assertion of civil authority over Maybee. (State's Brief at 36-38

12

A remote vendor is another name for a delivery seller.
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citing Jones, 13 411 U.S. at 148-49, and Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S.
95, 112 (2005)). Both of these cases involved off-reservation conduct. The State's preemption
analysis, therefore, suffers from a second fundamental flaw.
The State cites as a general rule:
"[a]bsent express federal Jaw to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation
boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state Jaw
otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.
(State's Brief at 37, citing Jones, 411 U.S. at 148-149 ). If the State had completely read Jones
or those cases cited in Jones, it would have learned that cases of "Indians going beyond
reservation boundaries" involved Indians who physically left their reservation and who
committed acts off the reservation. Jones, for example, involved a tribal nation who operated a
ski resort off the reservation. See, also (cases cited in Jones), Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game,
391 U.S. 392 (1968) (tribal members net fishing off their reservation); Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962) (tribes using salmon fish traps off their reservation); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942) (tribal member fishing without a state license off the
reservation); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) (tribal member hunting elk off the
reservation).
The State argues that it may regulate and enjoin Maybee's sales and shipments from his
reservation to Idaho consumers due to his off-reservation activity of introducing tobacco into

t3 The State refers to this case as "Mescalero," while Maybee refers to it as "Jones." The Court, however, should be
careful not to confuse this case with New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe is referenced and cited only in a footnote to the State's brief (State's Brief at 36, fn. 32),
but is referenced and cited throughout this Reply Brief and Appellant's Brief as "Mescalero."
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Idaho. (State's Brief at 36).

The State erroneously concludes that Maybee's off-reservation

activity automatically subjects him to Idaho law. (Id. at 38). The State confuses "Indians going
beyond reservation boundaries" with on-reservation conduct having off-reservation effects.

It is undisputed that Maybee, without leaving his place of business on the Seneca Nation
territory, conducts delivery sales to non-Indians for their off-reservation use.

Under the

Complementary Act, it is unlawful for a person to "sell, offer, or possess for sale in this state"
noncompliant cigarettes. LC. § 39-8403(3)(b). Maybee sells, offers and possesses cigarettes for
sale only on tribal territory outside of Idaho. Under the Minors' Access Act, a delivery seller
must obtain a permit "[p]rior to making delivery sales or shipping tobacco products." l.C. 385718. Again, Maybee makes delivery sales and ships tobacco products only from tribal territory
located outside of Idaho. Both the Complementary Act and the Minors' Access Act seek to
regulate conduct that takes place on an out-of-state Indian reservation by Maybee, an enrolled
tribal member. Absent express congressional authority, the State has the burden to show that
Maybee's on-reservation conduct has off-reservation effects that impairs a significant state
interest sought to be protected by these statutes. Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 336. The State, as a
matter of law, has not met its constitutional burden.

C.

The State Cannot Regulate Maybee's On-Reservation Conduct Without
Showing an Off-Reservation Effect that Impairs A State Interest Sought to
Be Regulated By These Challenged Statutes

In Mescalero, New Mexico attempted to enforce state hunting and fishing laws against
non-tribal members on tribal land. The Supreme Court stated that a "State's regulatory interest
will be particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate
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state intervention." 462 U.S. at 336. Although that case involved the on-reservation conduct of
non-tribal members, the same standard can be used for on-reservation conduct of tribal members,
which produces off-reservation effects.

1.

The State Does Not Refute That Maybee's Conduct Has No OffReservation Effects that Impairs Any Interest Sought to be Protected
by the Complementary Act.

The MSA Act and the Complementary Act were enacted to "safeguard the master
settlement agreement, the fiscal soundness of the state and the public health." On pages 54-60 of
Appellant's Brief, Maybee shows that his on-reservation conduct does not threaten the integrity
of the Master Settlement Agreement or alter the obligations of parties to that agreement and has
no effect on the fiscal soundness of the State. Maybee also asserts that the State has not alleged
or shown why the sale of "non-compliant" cigarettes threatens the public health any more than
the sale of "compliant" cigarettes. (Appellant's Brief at 60). In its brief, the State does not
identify the interests sought to be protected by the Complementary Act or refute Maybee's claim
that his conduct threatens no state interest. (See State's Brief at 35-41 ).
Instead, the State asserts that Maybee has not preserved this issue for appeal. (State's
Brief at 39-41). In his verified answer, Maybee asserted that the State's verified complaint "may
be subject to dismissal under several constitutional provisions because [Maybee] is an enrolled
member of the Seneca Nation and operates his business on the sovereign territory of the Seneca
Nation of Indian."

(R. 30). In its Reply Brief to the district court, the State asserted that the

Complementary Act is not preempted by "federal Indian law principles." (COE #8 at 9-13). The
district court framed the issues before it as "whether Maybee's sales take place in Idaho, whether
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the Indian Traders Act and/or the Indian Commerce Clause permits any state regulations of those
sales and whether Maybee must obtain the permit required by the MMA." (R. 43). The district
court subsequently ruled that the Complementary Act was not preempted by the Indian
Commerce Clause.

(R. 46). The issue of whether Indian Commerce Clause preempts the

enforcement of the Complementary Act was addressed by Maybee in his answer, by the State in
its motion and by the district court in its decision. The issue has been preserved for appeal.
Northcutt v. Sun Valley Company, 117 Idaho 351, 787 P.3d 1159 (1990).
2.

The State Can Effectively Monitor and Enforce its Laws Prohibiting
Sales to Minors Against Maybee Without Requiring a Permit.

The Legislature amended the Minors' Access Act in 2003 to ensure that delivery sales are
made "only to adults that are verified to be of legal age." 14 Accord LC. § 39-5701. The State
does not claim that Maybee has sold tobacco to minors or that his age verification procedures are
inadequate to prevent youth access. As Maybee has repeatedly stated, he verifies the name,
address and age of each Idaho consumer before he accepts an order for a delivery sale. (COE #6

,rz 1).

Maybee also informs Idaho consumers that it is illegal to sell or give tobacco products to

minors. (COE #6, 129, Ex. A). Since the State does not dispute the fact that Maybee sells only
to adult consumers for their personal use or that he reports all delivery sales, as required by
Jenkins Act, to the State, it cannot show an off-reservation effect that, in the words of the United
States Supreme Court, "necessitate state intervention." Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 336.
The State has more effective means to monitor Maybee's compliance than simply

14

http://www3.state.id.us/oasis/2003/H0357.html.
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requiring him to obtain a pennit. Enough though Maybee does not have a pennit, the State has
the ability to monitor and detect illegal sales by independently verifying the age of each
customer whose name and address are given to the State each month by Maybee. The State is
also free to conduct random, unannounced compliance checks to test Maybee's business
practices to ensure that he is not selling tobacco to minors. These compliance checks can be
conducted regardless of whether he has a pennit or not. The State could use the same degree of
effort, as it has used in this case, to seek fines, penalties or injunctive relief against Maybee
when, if ever, it has evidence that Maybee has made an illegal sale to a minor. A state pennit
requirement, therefore, serves no legitimate regulatory purpose that cannot otherwise be
achieved through other less intrusive means.
In its brief, the State focuses on two arguments to overcome the strong presumption of
preemption in this case. First, it asserts that the Idaho pennit only imposes a "minimal burden"
on Maybee. (State's Brief at 42, 44). Second, the United States Supreme Court has never
preempted a state from imposing a licensing requirement if no fee is imposed on the license.
(State's Brief at 42).
The United States Supreme Court has applied the "minimal burden" standard only when
a state asserts taxing authority over non-Indians purchasing cigarettes on Indian reservations.
See, M-, Moe, 425 U.S. at 483; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 159-160 (1980); Dep't of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea &
Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 71 (1994). In these cases, the Court found that tribal sellers could be
required by a state to collect "concededly lawful taxes" on sales made to non-Indians. Moe, 425
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U.S. at 483. The Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of state collection and record keeping
requirements on tribal sellers and wholesalers was only "a minimal burden designed to avoid the
likelihood that in its absence non-Indians purchasing from the tribal seller will avoid payment of
a concededly lawful tax." Id.; accord Colville, 447 U.S.at 159-160; Attea, 512 U.S. at 75. The
Supreme Court, therefore, permitted a "minimal burden" to cure an off-reservation effect (i.e.,
non-Indian purchasers' failure to pay concededly lawful taxes on cigarettes purchased for offreservation use). 15 Without an off-reservation effect, however, the State cannot impose any
burden upon Maybee, including the imposition of a no-fee permit.
This position is consistent with Moe. In Moe, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
a three-judge district court decision that held the State of Montana could not impose a retail
license or license fee on a Native American tobacco retailer. The federal district court ruled that,
although reservations sellers were not exempt from pre-collecting tobacco taxes on sales to nonIndians, they could not be compelled to obtain a state retail license. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 n. 18 (D. Mont. 1974), affd, 425 U.S. 463,
483 (1976). The United States Supreme Court affirmed this holding.
In its brief, the State contends that the "Supreme Court did not hold, as Maybee
apparently believes, that simply being required to obtain a license - if no fee was attached - was
preempted." (State's Brief at 42). Although the Supreme Court specifically states that a vendor
fee could not be assessed against a reservation seller, the Court did not affirm by modifying the
15

Because Maybee sells in interstate commerce, he is not required to collect taxes, but is required to report his sales
to the State so that it can collect these concededly lawful taxes from its residents. However, like New York, Idaho
does not require Native America tobacco sellers to collect state cigarettes taxes or sell tax-stamped cigarettes on
sales made from their reservation to non-tribal members. IDAPA 35.01.10.014.
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holding of the district court.
grounds for its holding.

The Supreme Court simply affirmed, without modifying the

The State offers nothing more than speculation as to facts never

presented to the Supreme Court. Maybee, on the other hand, cites to the district court's holding
in Moe, which was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, as additional authority to
support his claim that he cannot be required to obtain an Idaho permit. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. at 1307, affd, 425 U.S. at 483. ("Montana may not
impose its cigarette tax upon sales of cigarettes on the Flathead Reservation between members of
the Tribes; nor may Montana require a member of the Tribes who sells cigarettes on the Flathead
Reservation to possess its cigarette dealer's license.").
D.

The Court Cannot Award Attorney Fees to the State Pursuant to the
Complementary Act

The Complementary Act mandates that:
[i]n any action brought by the attorney general to enforce this chapter, the
attorney general shall be entitled to the costs of investigation, expert witness fees,
costs of action and reasonable attorney's fees."
LC. § 39-8407(5).

It appears that the provision imposes such fees and costs regardless of

success. In any case, the State cannot impose any fees or costs on a Native American tobacco
seller who has violated no applicable state law. The collection of such fees and costs would
amount to a tax upon Maybee for defending his action in the Idaho courts. Accord Mcclanahan,
411 U.S. 164; Moe, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). More importantly, since the provision does not
mandate that Maybee may collect similar fees and cost if he is successful, the State seeks to
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subject Maybee to a discriminatory state law. Accord Jones, 411 U.S. at 148-49. For these
reasons, the Court should deny the State's request for additional attorney fees and costs.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Appellant Maybee request that the Judgment entered
against him on February 26, 2006 be reversed and that the district court be directed to dismiss the
State's complaint against him.
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